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Furthermore, today's boards are subject more than ever to duties of diligence owing to the increasing threat of litigation. Legal compliance issues require modern board members to possess the requisite legal expertise.
In contrast to rather journalistic surveys, academic studies very rarely tackle director characteristics from the viewpoint of specialist knowledge (see Adams et al., 2010) .
Directors are typically divided into groups according to their independence from the firm. Usually, academic research identifies executive directors as being insiders and non-management directors as being outsiders. However, this ignores the fact that the two groups of directors may require different skills in order to execute their duties adequately. For instance, Fama and Jensen (1983) underline the importance of outside directors with specific expertise (e.g., in finance, corporate law or industrial technology).
Hence, outsiders do not all have one and the same purpose on the board. 1 See Section 301(m)(3)(A): "In general -Each member of the audit committee of the issuer shall be a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall otherwise be independent". And SOX Section 407(a): "Rules Defining 'Financial Expert'. The Commission shall issue rules, as necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors, to require each issuer, together with periodic reports required pursuant to sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reasons therefor, the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of at least 1 member who is a financial expert, as such term is defined by the Commission." More recent studies examine the impact of board demography (or board diversity) on firm performance or behavior, and there are also studies specifically addressing gender or ethnicity issues; yet, all are silent about the real value of the personal expertise that directors bring to the board. The question of personal profile needs to be addressed, because the performance benefits from career specifics are not directly correlated with demographics (i.e., females or foreigners). As an illustration, the management researchers Hillman et al. (2002) show that "community influentials" are more likely to be females or African-American. 2 Similarly, sociologists Zeng and Xie (2004) find evidence that U.S. employees educated abroad earn less than Americans or foreigners educated in the United States.
These two examples demonstrate that the omission of certain attributes, such as skill and experience, causes problems when assessing the aptitude of various profiles for specific posts. Specifically, ethnicity and gender may affect firm performance indirectly via other associated characteristics. Factors such as place of education (i.e., domestic or abroad) and experience (i.e., "community influentials" or "business experts") may be more relevant than demographic attributes in explaining firm performance. Hence, if such issues are omitted, the results of empirical investigations may lead to false interpretations, because more important features are left out. In terms of econometric quality, omitted factors are completely absorbed in the error term leading to endogeneity problems if one does not describe directors more precisely.
Numerous research results have been published on board structures since the 1970s.
These studies examine the determinants of board structure, the firm behavior affected by board structure, and lastly the influence of the board on firm performance. Nevertheless, there is no conclusive evidence determining what constitutes an optimal board composition. One reason might be that board composition has been examined using broad classifications such as board independence or demography. However, features relating to skills may be more important in studying board effectiveness. Unfortunately, studies examining the effect of education or business experience on firm performance are rare.
An explanation of why the personal characteristics of directors are mostly ignored may be due to the absence of theoretical foundations for explaining the impact that particular directors have on firm performance or company behavior. As an example, in contrast to independent non-executive directors, it is difficult to develop a rationale promoting more university graduates on boards. Additionally, empirical studies do not often address director skills, because detailed data of these characteristics is not readily avail- 2 In an earlier study, Hillman et al. (2000) classify board members skill-wise into three categories with specific board roles. The first group, "business experts" have executive experience as CEOs or as officers of large corporations. The second group, "support specialists" provide particular services to the boards; e.g., legal advice or financial expertise. And the final category includes politicians and university professors. This group has no specialized business background, but influences society and opinion-making. Such directors are denominated "community influentials" (Baysinger and Butler (1985) apply similar classifications). we use fixed effects to examine whether the unobserved heterogeneity of directors is an important factor in explaining firm performance.
Literature Review
The quasi non-existence of empirical studies on the education and business experience of board members leaves us with a narrow literature review. Our review is restricted to studies that address directors with financial expertise, especially bankers. To our knowledge, no previous study investigates the relationship between education and business experience (except for financial know-how), and firm performance. Financial know-how is one of many variables applied in this paper. Moreover, ever since the introduction of SOX, financially literate directors are legally requested on audit committees, and some countries historically have had an important banking-influence in their corporate governance (see La Porta et al., 1998) . To illustrate the issue, commercial bankers representing banking interests are encountered more frequently in Germany or Japan than in the United States, especially in large and stable firms (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001 ).
In 1995, German financial institutions held 19 percent of all directorships (Schroder and Schrader, 1997) .
Several empirical studies investigated the impact of directors with financial knowhow on firm policy and on stock prices. Bankers seem to affect firm policy, e.g., they increase external funding if the firm has poor forecasts, but good credit ratings or tend to decrease the debt ratio if the director is from a lending bank (see Güner et al., 2008; Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005) . Bankers are also more likely to be present on specific boards. Ramirez (1995) demonstrates that firms associated with J.P. Morgan in the United States are financially less constrained. Such associations usually implied that someone from J.P. Morgan would assume a seat on the board and thus monitor its client. Jeanjean and Stolowy (2009) indicate that the board and ownership structure is related to the proportion of bankers on French boards. Finally, Dittmann et al. (2010) show that bankers are negatively related to firm value in non-financial corporations in Germany. Furthermore, they detect that bankers do not perform a monitoring role neither in their own inter-est as debtholders nor as shareholders. Also, bankers do not seem to provide financial expertise for firms in financial distress. In contrast, they find evidence that bankers promote financial services and increase borrowing. These directors also seek appointments to larger boards that facilitate networking.
In brief, the benefits of financial expertise on a board is related to the intentions of the appointed directors. They might face conflicts of interests in their board capacity, especially where equity stakes and debt are concerned. For instance, stock prices react positively if an independent director with financial expertise is appointed to an audit committee of a firm with strong corporate governance (DeFond et al., 2005) . Thus, the firm's environment is important in addressing the effect of professional expertise or education on firm performance.
Data Description and Definition of Variables
One of the reasons why most empirical studies on the composition of the board of directors are restricted to simple board characteristics is data availability. Collecting more detailed information on directors is time consuming. In this study, information on 1,574 directorships from 224 annual reports in 2008 is hand-collected for all firms listed at the Swiss stock exchange. This is six years after the Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance (Economiesuisse, 2008) and the Directive on Information relating to Corporate Governance (SIX Exchange, 2008) were introduced. These standards led to improved information disclosure about each director in the annual report (e.g., curriculum vitae). This advance enabled us to obtain the detailed data required for our study.
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q
Firm performance is measured using Tobin's Q (Q). Q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of equity plus book value of total debt to the book value of total assets.
The study uses all classes of equity, including non-listed equity. The equity price is the mean value calculated on the basis of a 30-trading day window around the last trading day in 2007 multiplied by the number of the respective securities. 3 The market value of non-listed equity of listed companies is derived from the mean stock prices adjusted to the nominal value. The market value, based on the stock prices, can be seen as the risk-adjusted present value of all future cash flows. The gap between the market value and the book value can consist of intangible assets which, among other factors, may also mirror the ability of the board of directors.
Education Variables
The first group of director characteristics is related to its educational background. 
Business Experience Variables
The second group of variables reflects business experience. 
Control Variables
The firm-specific know-how of directors is measured by the fraction of executive directors on the board (EXEC) and board tenure (BTEN) which is the average tenure of the board members.
The firm's operational environment is proxied by firm size, its financial situation, the number of business and geographical segments, and the industry affiliation. Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of annual net sales and denoted ln(SALES). The financial situation is proxied by NDIV and is 1 if the firm did not pay out dividends in 2007 (and 0 otherwise). Financially constrained firms often rely on financial experts.
DIVISIONS is the number of business segments and REGIONS is the number of geographical segments where the corporation has significant business activities differing from other segments.
Moreover, industry fixed effects (INDUSTRY) are crucial in studies on corporate governance since industries differ in the qualification requirements they seek (see Table I ).
Our respective definition is based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) which uses 2-digit or super-sector definitions. Table I shows that firms partly compose their boards according to the industry they are in. Health care firms tend to have more natural scientists, whereas in the banking industry there are more economists and lawyers on the board. In contrast, business experience does not present such a strong pattern. The low level of average international and industrial experience in the banking industry is most probably attributable to the cantonal banks that primarily operate in Switzerland and whose boards are to some extent politically influenced. However, financial expertise is more evident in the banking industry. Interestingly, the health care industry again shows a high proportion of directors with industrial knowledge. Table II 
Summary Statistics

Boards in Switzerland
The data give evidence that the firm's industrial affiliation affects the composition of the board (see Table I ). Furthermore, we subsequently describe some cases of particularly homogeneous boards. Technology-based corporations have a high amount of graduates from ETH Zurich. 9 Firms located near the University of St. Gallen have boards composed by more than half of Ex-HSG students. 10 The same applies for firms in the Basel area or in Lausanne.
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Similarly, some boards are composed of graduates of the same field of study. Directors holding law degrees make up half or more of a number of boards including several financial firms. 12 Another interesting case is the board of "Pargesa", an investment company based in Geneva. Its board comprises four members out of 18 who were educated at the 9 "Bachem", "Komax", "Lem", "Schaffner", "Starrack Heckert", and "Uster Technologies" (all 60 percent);
"Canon", "Schweiter", and "Quadrant" (all 67 percent); and "Comet" and "Newave" 75 and 80 percent, respectively. 10 "Hügli" (71 percent), "St. Galler Kantonalbank" (71 percent), "Helvetia" (67 percent), "Bank CA St.
Gallen" (63 percent), and "BFW Liegeschaften" (50 percent). 11 "Sarasin", "National Suisse", and "Basellandschaftliche Kantonalbank" have 57 percent, 57 percent, and 73 percent graduates from the University of Basel, respectively. The board of "LO Holding" consists of five members who have all studied in Lausanne (University of Lausanne and EPFL). 12 "Baloise", "Bellevue Group", "Lindt & Sprüngli", "Perrot Duval", "SGS", "Swissquote", "Vaudoise
Assurances", "Victoria-Jungfrau" (all 50 percent); "Bank Sarasin", "Orell Füssli", "Sopracenerina", "Flughafen Zurich" (all around 60 percent); "Warteck Invest" (67 percent), "Nationale Suisse" (71 percent), and "Allreal" (80 percent). In many countries, business is in the hands of a homogeneous upper class like in the Netherlands and Sweden or of families like in Asia (Non and Franses, 2007; Claessens et al., 2000) . This is partly also the case in Switzerland. However, over 87 percent of all directors sit only on one board in comparison to 83 percent in the United States and 9 percent sit on two boards in contrast to 13 percent in the United States (RiskMetrics Groups, 2008) . Table III 
Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis is divided into five parts. First, a univariate ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis is conducted relating one explanatory variable to the response variable. Next, the second analysis uses multivariate models that include several con- In general, the reason for these low relationships is not surprising. For instance, in the case of natural scientists (NAT), it is quite obvious that they are unlikely to be equally valuable across all industries and that the relationship loses its significance when industry affiliation is included. In the words of Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) , boards are, on average, mostly in equilibrium. The average board cannot be improved with a change in its composition, because it is already adequately structured. 
Univariate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Analysis
Analysis on Education
The first set of multivariate models regresses Tobin's Q on variables of education. Columns I and II in Table VI employ Tobin's Q (t-statistics: 1.9156 (*)), and when controlled for this circumstance, the variable FOU loses its significance. When specifying definitions tightly (e.g., law graduates from the University of Zurich) no significance was evident at all (not presented).
Analysis on Business Experience
The second set of variables relates to business experience. The 4 business experience variables already explain 12.23 percent of the variation in Tobin's Q (R 2 ) (Table VII, The coefficients are estimated using OLS estimates with White (1980) robust standard errors. The dependent variable (DV) Q denotes Tobin's Q (market value of equity and book value of debt over total assets); Column I and II include the following independent variables: PR is professioral status; DR is a doctoral degree; MBA is a master of business administration degree; UNI is a university degree; FH is a university of applied sciences degree; Column III and IV include the following independent variables: ECO is graduation in business & economics; JUR is graduation in law; NAT is graduation in natural sciences; TEC is graduation in technical sciences; Column V and VI include the following independent variables: BS denotes graduates from the University of Basel, BE from the University of Berne, ETH from the Federal Institute of Technology, GE from the University of Geneva, SG from the University of St. Gallen (formerly HSG), ZH from the University of Zurich, OTHU from another Swiss university, and FOU denotes international university graduates; ln(SALES) is the natural logarithm of net sales; NDIV is 1 if the company did not pay out dividends in 2007; DIVISIONS is the number of business segments, and REGIONS is the number of geographical segments; INDUSTRY are two-digit ICB industry dummy variables. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. In the last Column (V), we include interaction terms with DIVISIONS and REGIONS interplaying with business experience. 13 International experience is expected to be valu- 
Analysis of Indices
Debates criticizing boards for being overly homogeneous in appealing to a strict sense of diversity ignore the fact that many directors can be linked together through alumni associations or other groups and may therefore also lack independence (see Schletti, 2006 ). This perspective is especially critical in a small country such as Switzerland where many managers and directors are graduates of the same university. On the one hand, it is very important that the linkages among board members are not too strong in order to prevent collusion and to promote opinion-building. On the other hand, mutual respect may be beneficial in tense situations.
In order to investigate the possible influence of educational diversity, we employ two series of concentration indices: the Herfindahl-Hirschman and the Shannon indices (see Appendix Section .1). Both indices measure the concentration in the "field of study"
(HHIEDU and SHIEDU) and "place of education" (HHIUNI and SHIUNI). Table VIII reveals that no index relating to educational diversity on the board is close to being significantly related to firm performance. Hence, personal affiliations between board members owing to a joint education is not relevant to valuation. 13 In order to circumvent multicollinearity problems with the interaction terms, the variables in the interaction terms have been centered. In other words, the sample average values of the variables have been subtracted from the values of the variables for each observation. The coefficients are estimated using OLS estimates with White (1980) robust standard errors. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q (market value of equity and book value of debt over total assets). INTL is the fraction of directors with international experience; CEOEX is the fraction of directors' experiences as CEOs; FKN is the fraction of directors with financial know-how; INDKN is the fraction of directors with industrial experience. EXEC is the fraction of executive directors, BTEN is the average tenure of board members; ln(SALES) is the natural logarithm of net sales; SGR is growth in annual sales; NDIV is 1 if the company did not pay out dividends in 2007; DAR is a debt-assets ratio (total debt over total assets); DIVER is 1 if the firm reports more than one business segment; LIUS is 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the U.S.; INDUSTRY are two-digit ICB industry dummy variables. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. The intercept is not presented. 3.07700 (***) 3.53400 (***) 3.42200 (***) 
Analysis at the Level of Individual Directors
All the precedent models employed aggregated values at the board level. In the next step, therefore, we use data at the level of individual directors which contains 1,574 observations. This sample allows us to examine interactions between the educational and professional backgrounds of directors and two broad demographic classifications of directors, namely gender and nationality. The fraction of females on the board is denoted GEN and the fraction of foreigners is FOR. 
Fixed Effects Analysis
The preceding regressions used data at the level of individual directors which contained 1,574 observations. Director characteristics have thus been tackled more precisely, but the omitted-variable bias continues to present a problem. Directors can still differ significantly in personal characteristics (e.g., talent) other than the variables defined. Hence, we employ director fixed effects, using the fact that some directors appear more than once in the sample (see Adams and Ferreira, 2008) .
1,574 seats are shared by 1,349 directors (see Table III Since we use cross-sectional (and not panel) data, the fact that directors may gain in experience or education over a long time horizon does not present a problem. The same is true for firm fixed effects which are often used in studies with panel data. Such firm effects are especially powerful if firm characteristics are time-invariant (or stationary) (e.g., industry affiliation). In contrast, firm characteristics that change such as sales growth are omitted. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) track managers over time and across companies. Hence, in contrast to directors, managers usually only serve for one firm at one and the same time. The empirical evidence shows that firm policies and performance highly depend on managerial fixed effects. Fixed effects account for unobserved heterogeneity among top managers. relations (BREL). The inclusion of industry effects in Column II leaves only insiders (EXEC) as a significant factor.
Finally, in Column III, the director fixed effects are included. The higher intercept in Column III compared to Column II suggests that the average valuation of multiple directorships is lower than for directors holding only one seat. Furthermore, the integration of such fixed effects increases R 2 from 16.97 percent to 22.03 percent. In other words, unobserved characteristics of directors appearing more than once in the sample explain only 5 percent of Tobin's Q and adding variables to a model always increases R 2 . In fact, adjusted R 2 actually decreases by about 5 percent. Nevertheless, the Waldtest, a heteroskedasticity-robust F-test, provides evidence that these effects significantly improve the model at a 1 percent level of significance.
Conclusions
Directors have various characteristics that are difficult to proxy. Most studies relating the board to firm performance use simple classifications (e.g., board independence or demography). This study uses a host of variables describing the educational and professional experience of directors.
First of all, the study indicates that firms compose their boards (partly) according to their needs. Natural scientists are common in health care firms, while there is an above average prevalence of economists in banks. The results show that while in univariate analysis there are significant relationships between these variables and Tobin's Q (e.g, a negative relation between lawyers and Q), these associations almost all vanish if control variables are included (especially industry effects). A persisting and significantly negative relation exists between education at Swiss universities other than those explicitly defined in our study and Tobin's Q. In addition, industrial know-how is significantly negatively related to Tobin's Q interacting with the number of divisions: industrial knowhow is not valuable if the number of business segments is high.
This suggests that, in general, boards are in equilibrium. There is no specific board composition (e.g., a high fraction of economists) that, on average, can enhance firm value.
In contrast, lasting relationships, i.e., significant relationships that remain after the inclusion of control variables, suggest that some boards are out of equilibrium. In other words, Tobin's Q could be improved on average if boards were to employ a specific percentage of, say, economists. This is not true in most cases.
Secondly, models that use data at the level of individual directors show that international experience impacts firm valuation while the simple fact of being a foreigner does .1 Indices
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index
The first concentration index is labeled Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (or Simpson, Blau, or Gibbs-Martin Index). This index is calculated as follows (p is the fraction of directors in the i-th group of a specific category (e.g., economists)):
An index value of 1 implies that the board consists of one group with equal director's characteristics. The lower the value, the less homogeneous the board is.
Shannon Index
The second concentration index is labeled Shannon Index (or Entropy or Teachman Index): This index is calculated as follows (p is the fraction of directors in the i-th group of a specific category (e.g., economists)):
